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1 Introduction
This document considers optimal institutional design of international bio-
diversity management, with a special focus on the following problem. How
much authority should be given to an international, potentially self-interested
central planner which is subject to lobbying? Are regulatory powers su-
cient, or should that planner have a budget to nance conservation subsidies?
This study is motivated by the following experience. The European Com-
mission (EC) manages biodiversity by two directives (cf. Ostermann 1998):
 Birds Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds;
 Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats
and of wild fauna and ora.
These directives call for the establishment of a network of designated sites,
called Natura 2000. They contain annexes with habitats and species listed as
being of Community interest, and whose conservation requires the designa-
tion of sites by the Member States. A Member State is obliged to guarantee
a \Favorable Conservation Status" to a Natura 2000 site with the obligations
of monitoring and reporting.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in the highly
complex political structure of the EU. Weber and Christophersen (2002)
describe the political inuence of the forest-owner associations (CEPF and
BNFF) and the environmental NGOs (WWF and Fern) on the process of
implementing the EU habitats directive (HD). They highlight the relation-
ship between the involvement of interest groups in the political process and
the acceptance of legislation among their members. This document is inter-
ested in the political equilibrium in which the interest groups representing
the member regions lobby the Commission over biodiversity management.
EU environmental policy relies heavily on regulation rather than on other
mechanisms for the following reasons (Ledoux et al. 2000):
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 Because that policy lacked a proper legal basis up to 1987, it had to rely
on the \implied powers" of Article 235 of the Treaty, which stipulated
the use of directives and nothing else.
 With the ratication of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU can only
adopt eco-taxes and other scal measures with the unanimous agree-
ment of every state (Jordan 1998).
 The founding Member States gave the EU a powerful institutional in-
centive to regulate wherever possible by vesting it with so few nancial
resources of its own. From the Commission's perspective, regulation
has the benet of being paid for by private actors in the Member States
rather than the EU itself (Majone 1996).
This document compares two cases of biodiversity management:
 The current situation: the Commission regulates the use of land.
 The Commission gets more authority: it can use subsidies and dis-
tribute the costs of these to the member regions.
MacArthur and Wilson (1967) show that the total number of species is
an increasing function of the habitat area. In the case where the number of
species yields utility, Swanson (1994), Barbier and Schulz (1997) and Endres
and Radke (1999) consider the optimal area of habitat, comparing the bene-
ts of its maintenance with the opportunity cost of using land in production.
In this setup, they analyze the eects of an external shock (e.g. a change in
trade policy) on biodiversity. Rowthorn and Brown (1999) introduce exoge-
nous technological change into the optimal habitat model, showing that a
country with a high discount rate preserves more land when the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and species exceeds unity. Without R&D,
a subsidy to conserved land aects only on the area devoted to conservation.
This document shows that such a subsidy is distorting, if it aects R&D
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through relative factor prices. Consequently, the regulation of land use is
more useful as a tool of environmental policy.
In this document, the central planner is self-interested and subject to
lobbying, households love biodiversity, goods are produced from labor and
land and biodiversity is an increasing function of habitat land in all regions.
There are two ways of modeling lobbying: the all-pay auction model, in which
the lobbyist that makes the greater eort wins with certainty, or the menu-
auction model, in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent on the
politician's actions. In the all-pay auction model, lobbying expenditures
are incurred by all the lobbyists before the politician takes an action.1 In
the menu-auction model, it is not possible for a lobbyist to spend money
and eort on lobbying without getting what he lobbied for. The menu-
auction model is chosen for this document, because it characterizes better
the case in which the central planner's decision variables (e.g., regulatory
constraints, subsidies) are continuous and the interest groups obtain marginal
improvements in their position by lobbying.
Palokangas (2013) shows that if taxation is distorting, regions are identi-
cal and policy instruments are region-specic, then the replacement of regu-
lation by subsidies hampers biodiversity and welfare. In contrast, this doc-
ument examines the case where taxation is non-distorting, the regions have
dierent technology and dierent primary resources, and the policy instru-
ments (i.e. taxes, subsides and the regulatory constraint) are uniform and
independent of technological changes in all regions. Section 2 constructs the
basic structure of the economy. Section 3 models the behavior of a single
region. Section 4 presents the Pareto optimum as a reference case. Sections
5 and 6 examine the two alternatives of biodiversity management: regulation
and conservation subsidies.
1A good example of this is Johal and Ulph (2002) in which local interest groups lobby
to inuence the probability of getting their favorite type of government elected.
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2 The model
Consider a large number (a \continuum") of regions that are placed evenly
over the limit [0; 1] and produce the same consumption good at the price p.
Region j 2 [0; 1] supplies mj units of labor and hj units of land inelastically.
It devotes the amount lj of labor to production and the rest zj to R&D, and
the amount nj of land to production and the rest bj to conservation:
mj = lj + zj; hj = nj + bj: (1)
MacArthur andWilson (1967) show empirically that the number of species
expected to survive in an island is proportional to the area of that island.
Because any area bj devoted to conservation in any region j 2 [0; 1] functions
like an \island" in the MacArthur-Wilson sense (cf. Rowthorn and Brown
1999), biodiversity in the economy, b, can be specied as a linearly homoge-
neous function B of the conserved areas throughout all regions j 2 [0; 1]:
b
:
= B
 
bjj j 2 [0; 1]

: (2)
Because all markets are competitive, region j behaves as if it were a single
welfare-maximizing agent (hereafter called region j) that controls all of its
resources. Its expected utility starting at time T is2
 j
:
= E
Z 1
T
cjb
e ( T )d;  > 0;  > 0; (3)
where E is the expectations operator,  time,  the constant rate of time
preference, cj its consumption, b biodiversity, and  a parameter: the higher
, the more the households appreciate biodiversity in the economy, b. Because
there is no money in the model that would pin down the nominal price level
at any time, the monetary unit can be freely chosen. Thus, the consumer
price p is chosen equal to the externality eect b in the model:
p = b: (4)
2With the general form of the utility function,
R1
T
c1 j b
e ( T )d, where  2 [0; 1)
is a constant, it would be very dicult to nd a stationary state in the model.
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2.1 Technology
The improvement of technology in region j depends on labor devoted to R&D
in that region, zj. In a small period of time dt,
 the probability that R&D will lead to development of a new technology
with a jump of the technology serial number from j to j+1 is jzjdt,
where j is the constant productivity in R&D, while
 the probability that R&D will remain without success is 1  jzjdt.
Noting (1), this denes a Poisson process j with
dj =

1 with probability jzjdt,
0 with probability 1  jzjdt, zj = mj   lj; (5)
where dj is the increment of the process j. Given (5), it holds true that
(cf. Appendix A)
E
Z 1
T
aje ( T )d =
1
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj) : (6)
2.2 Production
When region j develops a new technology, it increases its total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) by the constant a > 1.3 Its TFP is equal to aj , where j is
its technology serial number. Given this TFP, region j is subject to the CES
production function f j(lj; nj) with lj (nj) as the input of labor (land):
yj = a
jf j(lj; nj); f
j
l > 0; f
j
n > 0; f
j
ll < 0; f
j
ln > 0; f
j
nn < 0; (7)
where the subscript l (n) denotes the partial derivative with respect to lj
(nj). Because the labor (land) market is competitive, the producer real wage
wj (producer real rent rj) is equal to the marginal product of labor (land):
wj = @yj=@lj = a
jf jl (lj; nj); rj = @yj=@lj = a
jf jn(lj; nj): (8)
3Because the variety in Poisson technological change can be wholly characterized by
the region-specic parameters j for j 2 [0; 1] [cf. (5)], one can normalize the technological
jumps throughout regions j 2 [0; 1] equal to the same constant a.
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Noting (7) and (8), the expenditure shares of land j and labor 1   j are
the functions of the relative input lj=nj as follows:
njf
j
n(lj; nj)
f j(lj; nj)
:
= j

lj
nj

;
wjlj
yj
=
ljf
j
l (lj; nj)
f j(lj; nj)
= 1  j

lj
nj

:
(9)
Let lj (blj) be labor in production, nj (bnj) land in production, bj (bbj) land
in conservation and rj (brj) the producer rent under current technology j
(under previous technology j   1) for region j 2 [0; 1]. Given (1) and (8),
the rent under previous technology is determined by
brj = aj 1f jn(blj; bnj) = aj 1f jn(blj; hj  bbj): (10)
In this document, the results are derived in the stationary state where
the quantities of inputs are independent of technology, lj = blj and bj = bbj.
Noting (8) and (10), the rent rj increases by the proportion rj=brj = a with
a change of technology from j   1 to j in region j in the stationary state.
2.3 Policy instruments
It is assumed that the policy instruments (taxes, subsidies, regulatory con-
straints) of the (benevolent or self-interested) central planner are (i) uniform
for all regions and (ii) technology-invariant, i.e. independent of technological
changes in the regions.
With grandfathering, the policy instrument for the conservation of land,
, must have a base that is determined by the history, but updated over
time. In models with discrete time, that base would be calculated by a
moving average of the past areas for conservation. In the quality-ladders
model of this document where time is continuous, that base is specied as
follows: the minimum amount of conserved land under new technology, bj,
is in xed proportion  to conserved land under previous technology, bbj,
bj  bbj for j 2 [0; 1], where  > 0. (11)
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There is a subsidy s to expenditures on conserved land, rjbj, where rj is
the real rent in region j, for all regions j 2 [0; 1]. These subsidies are nanced
by a tax  on expenditures on conserved land under previous technology, brkbbk,
for all regions k 2 [0; 1]:
s
Z 1
0
rjbjdj = 
Z 1
0
brkbbkdk: (12)
In the stationary state (cf. Subsection 2.2), noting (12), the tax is given by


bj = bbj and rj = abrj for j 2 [0; 1]= as: (13)
The revenue-raising tax  in (12) is wholly non-distorting. Each region
k takes expenditures brkbbk as given (i.e. as a lump-sum tax), and taxes and
subsidies will match for each region j 2 [0; 1] in the stationary state.
3 Single region j 2 [0; 1]
Region j pays political contributions Rj to the central planner which consists
of civil servants throughout all regions k 2 [0; 1]. Thus, each region j receives
a xed proportion j of total contributions
R
:
=
Z 1
0
Rkdk: (14)
These proportions sum up to one:
j  0 for j 2 [0; 1];
Z 1
0
jdj = 1: (15)
The budget constraint of region j is the following:
cj = yj + srjbj   brjbbj + (jR Rj)=p; (16)
where cj is consumption, yj factor income (= output), srjbj subsidies to
conserved land, brjbbj taxes, Rj contributions region j pays to the central
planner in nominal terms, jR the proportion of total contributions received
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by country j in nominal terms, and (jR   Rj)=p net income from political
contributions in real terms. Given (1), (4), (7), (8), (10) and (16), the
expected utility of region j starting at time T , (3), becomes
 j = E
Z 1
T

yj + srjbj   brjbbj + jR Rj
p

be ( T )d
= E
Z 1
T
h 
yj + srjbj   brjbbjb + jR Rjie ( T )d
= E
Z 1
T
n
ajf j(lj; nj) + sa
jf jn(lj; nj)bj   aj 1f jn(blj; bnj)bjb
+ jR Rj
o
e ( T )d
= E
Z 1
T
ajb

f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)
  
a
bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)e ( T )d + jR Rj : (17)
Region j maximizes its expected utility (17) by labor input lj and con-
served land bj subject to technological change (5) and the regulatory con-
straint (11), taking the tax  , the subsidy s, biodiversity b, inputs under
previous technology (blj;bbj) and the political contributions (Rj; R) as given.
This maximization implies (cf. Appendix B):
 j(j; s; ; ; b; R;Rj)
:
= b
j(j; s; ; ) + (jR Rj)=; (18)
@
j
@

bj=bbj ; s==0=  

jjbbj
hj   bj ;
@
j
@

bj>bbj= 0; (19)
@
j
@s
+
@
j
@
d
ds

lj=blj ; bj=bbj ; =as = 0; (20)
(1  s)j f
j(lj; hj   bj)
hj   bj + sbjf
j
nn(lj; hj   bj)

= 0 for bj > bbj,
> 0 for bj = bbj, (21)
(a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj) =

(1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)lj

 f j(lj ; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj ; hj   bj)  bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)=a 1; (22)
where 
 is a dierentiable function and j = j(lj=(hj   bj)).
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In the equilibrium conditions (21) and (22), there are two unknown vari-
ables lj and bj and two known variables s and . This system denes inputs
(lj; bj) as a function of the subsidy s and the regulatory parameter . Noting
this and and (2), one obtains
lj(s; ) and bj(s; ) for j 2 [0; 1], b(s; ) := B
 
bj(s; )j j 2 [0; 1]

;
@b
@s
=
@bj
@s
=
@lj
@s
= 0 , bj = bbj for j 2 [0; 1];
@b
@
=
@bj
@
=
@lj
@
= 0 , bj > bbj for j 2 [0; 1]: (23)
The functions lj, bj and b are dierentiable everywhere except in points where
the regime bj = bbj switches to the regime bj > bbj or vice versa.
4 The Pareto optimum
Noting (6), (7), (12), (14), (15), (17) and (23), the welfare of the representa-
tive agent in the economy is
W =
Z 1
0
 jdj =
Z 1
0
E
Z 1
T

yj + srjbj   brjbbj + jR Rj
p

be ( T )d dj
=
Z 1
0
E
Z 1
T

yj +
Z 1
0
(srjbj   brjbbj)dj| {z }
=0
+
1
p
Z 1
0
(jR Rj)dj| {z }
=0

be ( T )d
=
Z 1
0
E
Z 1
T
yjb
e ( T )d = b
Z 1
0
E
Z 1
T
ajf j(lj; hj   bj)e ( T )d dj
=
Z 1
0
bf j(lj; hj   bj)E
Z 1
T
aje ( T )d dj
=
Z 1
0
b
ajf j
 
lj(s; ); hj   bj(s; )

+ (1  a)j[mj   lj(s; )] dj: (24)
The benevolent central planner maximizes the representative agent's welfare
(24) by choosing the regulatory parameter  and the subsidy s. Noting (9)
and (23), the rst-order conditions of this maximization are given by
@W
@
=
Z
bj=bbj
bajf j(lj; hj   bj)
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)
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

f jl
f j
  (a  1)j
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

@lj
@
+

b
@b
@
  f
j
n
f j
@bj
@

dj
=
Z
bj=bbj
bajf j(lj; hj   bj)
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)
1  j
lj
  (a  1)j
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

@lj
@
+

b
@b
@
  
j
hj   bj
@bj
@

dj = 0;
(25)
@W
@s
=
Z
bj>bbj
bajf j(lj; hj   bj)
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)


f jl
f j
  (a  1)j
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

@lj
@s
+

b
@b
@s
  f
j
n
f j
@bj
@s

dj
=
Z
bj>bbj
bajf j(lj; hj   bj)
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)
1  j
lj
  (a  1)j
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

@lj
@s
+

b
@b
@s
  
j
hj   bj
@bj
@s

dj = 0:
(26)
Because the levels of productivity, aj , are random variables for j 2 [0; 1], the
only possible stationary state that corresponds to the technology-invariant
controls (s; ) and satises (25) and (26) is given by
1  j
lj
  (a  1)j
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

@lj
@
+

b
@b
@
=
j
hj   bj
@bj
@
for j 2 [0; 1] with bj = bbj, (27)
1  j
lj
  (a  1)j
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

@lj
@s
+

b
@b
@s
=
j
hj   bj
@bj
@s
for j 2 [0; 1] with bj > bbj. (28)
First, assume that the policy instrument  is high enough to make the
regulatory constraint binding, bj = bbj, for all regions j 2 [0; 1]. Given (2),
this implies
bj = bbj and @bj
@
= bbj for j 2 [0; 1];
b = bb and @b
@
= bb, where := B bbjj j 2 [0; 1]. (29)
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Furthermore, the previous and present values for inputs bj, j 2 [0; 1], must
be equal in the stationary state, bj = bbj for j 2 [0; 1] and b = bb. Plugging
these conditions and (29) into (27) yields
1  j   (a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

1
lj
@lj
@
+  =
jbj
hj   bj
when bj = bbj for j 2 [0; 1]. (30)
Second, assume that the policy instrument  is small enough to make
the regulatory constraint non-binding, bj > bbj, for all regions j 2 [0; 1].
Plugging (29) into (27) and (28) yields
1  j   (a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)

1
lj
@lj
@s
+

b
@b
@s
=
j
hj   bj
@bj
@s
when bj > bbj for j 2 [0; 1]. (31)
5 Regulation
For the remainder of this document, it is assumed that the central planner
is self-interested and subject to lobbying. It maximizes the present value of
the expected ow of the political contributions at time T ,4
E
Z 1
T
Z 1
0
Rje
 ( T )d =
1

Z 1
0
Rjdj: (32)
This section considers the case where the central planner has no budget
of its own, s =  = 0. Given this and (2), the value functions (18) become
 j(j; 0; ; 0; b; R;Rj): (33)
A common agency game is constructed as follows (cf. Grossman and Helpman
1994). First, the regions set their political contributions Rj conditional on
the central planner's prospective policy , taking total contributions R as
given.5 Second, the central planner sets  and collects the contributions.
4This is a modication of the idea of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
5The crucial point in the common agency game is that each region j can credibly
commit itself to its contribution function Rj().
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Third, the regions maximize their expected utility given the contributions
Rj and R. The game is solved in reverse order: rst for a region (stage 3)
and then for the political equilibrium (stages 2 and 1).
The central planner maximizes the present value (32) by its policy . Each
region j maximizes the value of its optimal program, (33), by inuencing the
central planner by its contributions Rj, but taking total contributions R as
given. Because Rj() if the strategy of region j, given (29), the equilibrium
conditions of this game are [cf. (ii) and (iii) in Appendix C]
 = argmax

1

Z 1
0
Rk()dk; (34)
 = argmax

 j(j; 0; ; 0; b; R;Rj) with b = bb: (35)
Given (1), (18) and s = 0, the conditions (35) for all regions j 2 [0; 1] are
equivalent to
0 =
@ j
@
+
@ j
@b
db
d|{z}
=bb
+
@ j
@Rj|{z}
= 1=
dRj
db
= b
@
j
@
+ b 1
jbb  1

dRj
db
=   b 
j
jbbj
hj   bj + b
 1
jbb  1

dRj
db
and
dRj
db
= b
j


bb
b
 
bbjj
hj   bj

for j 2 [0; 1]:
Given this, the condition (34) is equivalent to
0 =
1

Z 1
0
dRj
db
dj = b
Z 1
0

j


bb
b
 
bbjj
hj   bj

dj: (36)
Because the present and previous values of inputs must be the same, b = bb
and bj = bbj for j 2 [0; 1], in the stationary state, the equation (36) becomes
0 =
Z 1
0

j

   bj
j
hj   bj

dj:
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Because 
j are random variables for j 2 [0; 1], the only possible stationary
state that corresponds to the technology-invariant control  is
j = 
hj   bj
bj
for j 2 [0; 1]. (37)
With no central planner's budget s =  = 0, the equilibrium conditions
for the regions, (22), are equivalent to
(a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj) = 1  
j for j 2 [0; 1]. (38)
Plugging these into the equilibrium conditions for the benevolent central
planner, (30), yields those for the self-interested planner, (37). Thus, one
obtains the following result:
Proposition 1 Regulation leads to a Pareto optimum. Consequently, an
agreement between the regions on the central planner with the regulatory in-
strument  is self-enforcing: no regions have incentives to break it.
The introduction of the central planner, benevolent or self-interested, helps
to internalize the externality through biodiversity.
6 The conservation subsidy
This section considers the case where the policy instrument  is small enough
to make the regulatory constraint non-binding, bj > bbj for j 2 [0; 1]. The
value functions (18) and the equilibrium conditions (22) and (21) for regions
then become
 j(j; s; 0; ; b; R;Rj); (39)
(a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj) =

(1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)lj

 f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)  abbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj) 1 for j 2 [0; 1];
(40)
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s = [jf j=(hj   bj)| {z }
+
  bj|{z}
+
f jnn|{z}
 
] 1 jf j=(hj   bj)| {z }
+
> 0 for j 2 [0; 1]: (41)
Given (41), conserved land is always subsidized.
The central planner maximizes the present value of the expected ow of
the political contributions at time T , (32). Region j maximizes the value of its
optimal program, (39), by inuencing the central planner by its contributions
Rj, but taking total contributions R as given. Because s is a policy and Rj(s)
the strategy of region j, then the equilibrium conditions are [cf. (ii) and iii)
in Appendix C]:
s = argmax
s
1

Z 1
0
Rk(s)dk; (42)
s = argmax
s
 j(j; s; 0; ; b; R;Rj) for j 2 [0; 1]: (43)
Given (1) and (18), the conditions (43) for j 2 [0; 1] are equivalent to
0 =
@ j
@s
+
@ j
@
@
@s
+
@ j
@b
db
ds
+
@ j
@Rj
dRj
ds
= b

@
j
@s
+
@
j
@
@
@s

+ b 1
j
db
ds
  1

dRj
ds
and
dRj
ds
= b


j

b
db
ds
+
@
j
@s
+
@
j
@
@
@s

for j 2 [0; 1]:
Given this, the condition (42) is equivalent to
0 =
1

Z 1
0
dRj
ds
dj = b 1
db
ds
Z 1
0

jdj + b
Z 1
0

@
j
@s
+
@
j
@
@
@s

dj: (44)
In the stationary state it holds true that [cf. (13)]
lj = blj and bj = bbj for j 2 [0; 1],  = as. (45)
Noting (20), the condition (44) becomes db
ds
= 0. Because it is plausible to
assume that the subsidy s to conservation does not decrease the area bj under
conservation,
dbj
ds
 0, in each country j 2 [0; 1], from db
ds
= 0 it follows that
db
ds
=
dbj
ds
= 0 for j 2 [0; 1]. (46)
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In the stationary state, given (7) and (45), the equilibrium conditions for
the regions, (40) and (41), become
(a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj) =

(1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)lj

 f j(lj; hj   bj) + (s  =a)| {z }
=0
bjf
j
n(lj; hj   bj)
 1
= 1  j + s|{z}
>0
bjlj
f jln
f j| {z }
>0
> 1  j for j 2 [0; 1]: (47)
Noting these and (23), the benevolent central planner's equilibrium condi-
tions (31) can be written as follows:

b
@b
@s
  
j
hj   bj
@bj
@s
=

(a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)   1 + 
j

1
lj
@lj
@s
= s|{z}
>0
bj
f jln
f j| {z }
>0
@lj
@s|{z}
6=0
6= 0 for j 2 [0; 1]:
These are in contradiction with the self-interested central planner's equilib-
rium conditions (46). Thus, one obtains the following result:
Proposition 2 The conservation subsidy does not lead to a Pareto optimum.
Consequently, an agreement between the regions on the central planner with
the subsidy s is not self-enforcing: regions have incentives to break it.
Finally, given (23), the equilibrium conditions (46) imply bj = bbj for
j 2 [0; 1]. This means that the equilibrium with the subsidy corresponds
an equilibrium with regulation with some value of the policy parameter .
Because the equilibrium conditions (47) are in contradiction with the Pareto
optimality conditions with regulation, (38), one obtains the following result:
Proposition 3 A switch from regulation to a conservation subsidy decreases
welfare.
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Technological change due to R&D plays a crucial rule in Propositions 2
and 3. Without it [i.e. j ! 0 in (5) for all j] all labor were devoted to
production (i.e. lj = mj for j 2 [0; 1]) and a subsidy to the conservation of
land would not distort the allocation of labor between production and R&D.
7 Conclusions
This paper considers an economy in which the conservation of land yields
utility through biodiversity, the regions improve their eciency by R&D
and lobby a self-interested central planner over biodiversity management.
Two policy instruments are compared: the regulation of land use and the
subsidy to conserved land, which is nanced in a non-distorting manner.
It is plausible to assume all policy instruments are uniform for all regions
and technology-invariant, i.e. independent of any changes of technology that
emerge in any region. The main ndings are the following.
With regulation, the central planner determines the use of land, fully
internalizing the externality through biodiversity. In contrast, a subsidy to
conserved land violates the Pareto-optimality condition for the allocation
of labor between production and R&D, decreasing welfare. If there were
no R&D-based growth, then all labor were devoted to production and the
subsidy could not violate the allocation of labor. Furthermore, an agreement
between the regions on the central planner with the regulatory instrument is
self-enforcing: there are no regions that have incentives to break it.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
game-theoretical model is used to derive results on growth and biodiversity,
the following conclusion seems to be justied. The prospect of lobbying
changes the outcome of biodiversity management fundamentally: direct reg-
ulation of land use will but the use of a conservation subsidy will not lead
to the rst best and a self-enforcing solution. In the case of Natura 2000,
for instance, regulation without any budget may be an appropriate degree of
16
authority for the Commission.
Appendix
A Equation (6)
Given the stochastic process (5), dene the expected value

(j) = E
Z 1
T
aje ( T )d;
where E is the expectation operator. The Bellman equation corresponding
to this is given by (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
r
(j) = a
j + jzj


(j + 1)  
(j)

; (48)
where r
(j) is the revenue from assets 
(j) at the market interest rate r,
aj current income from assets 
(j) and jzj


(j+1) 
(j)

the expected
increase of the value 
(j) with probability jzj. Let us try the solution

(j) = a
j=; (49)
in which the subjective discount factor  > 0 is independent of j. Inserting
(49) into the Bellman equation (48) yields
r =
aj

(j)
+ jzj


(j + 1)

(j)
  1

= + (a  1)jzj: (50)
Solving for  from (50) and inserting it into (49), and noting (5), one obtains
E
Z 1
T
aje r( T )d = 
(j) =
aj
r + (1  a)jzj =
aj
r + (1  a)j(mj   lj) :
B Results (18)-(22)
The maximization of the expected utility (17) by (lj; bj) s.t. (5) and (11),
given (s; ; b;blj;bbj; Rj; R), is equivalent to the maximization of
E
Z 1
T
aj
h
f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj) 

a
bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)ie ( T )d
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by (lj; bj) s.t. (5) and (11), given (s; ;blj;bbj). The value of this optimal
program starting at time T is

j(j; s; ; )
:
= max
(lj ; bj) s.t.(5),(11)
E
Z 1
T
aj
h
f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)
  
a
bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)ie ( T )d: (51)
Noting this, the expected utility (17) becomes
 j = b
j(j; s; ; ) + (jR Rj)=: (52)
The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (51) is given
by (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994)

j(j; s; ; ) = max
(lj ; bj) s.t. (5),(11)
j(lj; bj; j; s; ; ); (53)
where
j(lj; bj; j; s; ; )
:
= aj

f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)  bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)=a
+ j(mj   lj)


j(j + 1; s; ; )  
j(j; s; ; )

:
(54)
Noting (9) and  = 
 
lj=(hj bj)

, the maximization of (54) by (lj; bj) subject
to bj  bbj [cf. (11)] leads to the rst-order conditions
@j
@lj
= aj [f jl (lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)]  j


j(j + 1; s)  
j(j; s)

= aj

(1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj)=lj + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)

  (a  1)j
j(j; s; ; ) = 0; (55)
@j
@bj
=  aj [(1  s)f jn(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jnn(lj; hj   bj)]
=  aj(1  s)jf j(lj; hj   bj)=(hj   bj) + sbjf jnn(lj; hj   bj)
= 0 for bj > bbj,
< 0 for bj = bbj. (56)
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To solve the dynamic program, one can set the value of the program, 
j,
is in xed proportion 'j to the instantaneous utility at the optimum:

j(j; s; ; ) =
'ja
j

f j(lj ; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj ; hj   bj)  bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)=a; (57)
where 'j is a constant and (l

j ; b

j) is the optimal value of (lj; bj). This implies

j(j + 1; s; ; )=

j(j; s; ; ) = a: (58)
Inserting (57) and (58) into the Bellman equation (53) and (54) yields
1='j = + (1  a)j(mj   lj ) > 0: (59)
Inserting (9), (59) into (57), one obtains the value function

j(j; s; ; ) =
aj max
(lj ; bj) s.t. bj  bbj
f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)  abbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj)
with the properties
@
j
@

bj=bbj ; s==0=  
f jn(lj; hj   bj)
f j(lj; hj   bj)

j dbj
d|{z}
=bbj
=   j 

jbbj
hj   bj ; (60)
@
j
@

bj>bbj= 0; (61)
@
j
@s
=

jbjf
j
n(lj; hj   bj)
f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)  abbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)
=

jbjf
j(lj; hj   bj)j
f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)  abbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj) ;
@
j
@
=   

jbbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)=a
f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj; hj   bj)  abbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj) ;
@
j
@s
+
@
j
@
d
ds

lj=blj ; bj=bbj ; =as = 0: (62)
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From (55), (57) and (59) it follows that
(a  1)jlj
+ (1  a)j(mj   lj) = (a  1)jlj'j
=
lj'j

j
aj

(1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj)=lj + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)

=
'j

j
aj

(1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)lj

=

f j(lj ; hj   bj) + sbjf jn(lj ; hj   bj)  bbjf jn(blj; hj  bbj)=a 1
 (1  j)f j(lj; hj   bj) + sbjf jln(lj; hj   bj)lj: (63)
The results (18)-(22) are given by (56) and (60)-(63).
C The lobbying game
Following Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for this game is a policy  and a set of contribution schedules
R1(); :::; RJ() such that the following conditions (i)  (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor's
income,  j  0.
(ii) The policy  maximizes the central planner's welfare (32) taking the
contribution schedules Rj as given.
(iii) Region j cannot have a viable strategy Rj() that yields it a higher
level of utility than in equilibrium, given the others' contributions.
(iv) Region j provides the central planner at least with the level of utility
as in the case in which it oers nothing (Rj = 0), and the central plan-
ner responds optimally given the contribution functions of the other
regions.
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